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What Process Is Due? 
 
Frank P. Ardaiolo 
 
The Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution declares that no state shall 
“deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Due process is 
difficult to define precisely, because it is a flexible concept related to time and circumstances. In 
the words of the Supreme Court in Cafeteria and Restaurant Workers v. McElroy (1961), “the 
nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to 
every imaginable situation, and it is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstance.” 
 As a legal concept, due process has been held to have two dimensions, substantive and 
procedural (Alexander and Solomon, 1972). Substantive due to process speaks to the nature and 
purpose of rules and regulations of institutions. Courts have held that a government cannot 
deprive a person of a life, liberty, or property by an unreasonable act without a legitimate 
purpose. Procedural due process speaks to the process of judicial decision making. Obviously, it 
lies at the heart of the question, What process is due? 
 It may be of some comfort to the harried student affairs administrator in a disciplinary 
situation involving a student that the question “What process is due this student?” has been asked 
since 1200 A.D. At that time, organized learning was associated with moral development and the 
church. In Paris, a group of clerical students was involved in a brawl with citizens of the 
community and the students were arrested by secular authorities. In sorting out the conflict 
between town and grown, King Philip Augustus, bowing to Church pressure, granted the 
students of the nascent University of Paris their first privilege when he decreed: “Neither our 
provost nor our judges shall lay hands on a student for any offense whatever, nor shall they place 
him in our prison, unless such a crime has been committed by the student that he out to be 
arrested. And in that case, our judges shall arrest him on the spot, without striking him at all, 
unless he resists, and shall hand him over to the ecclesiastical judge, who ought to guard him in 
order to satisfy us and the one suffering the injury” (Wieruszowski, 1966, p. 137). The 
responsibility for disciplining students has remained with colleges and universities for the last 
800 years. However, the question of what is required to guarantee due process continues to be 
asked on the campus and in the courts.  
 This chapter undertakes to answer that question by examining current discipline issues 
and applicable case law. The principle of fundamental fairness will be discussed in detail, and 
examples of its application to discipline and academic procedures will be given. Finally, some 
standards for student affairs administrators in examining current procedures and practices will be 
suggested.  
Fundamental Fairness 
 The evolution of the legal relationship between students and postsecondary institutions 
can be understood as emanating from the sources of legal constraints described in Chapter One. 
These sources of legal constraints continually interact with the decisions reached by courts at all 
levels of the American judicial system. In general, court decisions that affect the student affairs 
administrator relate to the administrator’s functional responsibility for student discipline 
(Dannells, 1977).  
 The doctrine of in loco parentis comes from common law, judicial interpretations 
inherited from England by the American colonies. This doctrine, which governed the American 
college view of discipline for many years, holds that college authorities act in the place of 
parents. This allows institutions to make and enforce any rule concerning the moral, physical, 
and intellectual betterment of students that parents would make.  
 The civil rights movement of the 1960s forced both a legal and a philosophic change. 
Constitutional law, which afforded students’ rights as citizens under the United States 
Constitution, came to predominate. No longer could the universities, through administrators, act 
in place of students’ parents; rather, the Constitution guaranteed students certain due process 
rights, and it was the responsibility of the administrator to see that these rights were provided.   
 Today, the scene is changing again, as many current cases appeal to contract law. (See 
Chapter Three in this volume.) Student consumers are demanding better information choice, 
hearing, and safety as partners in their contractual relationship with postsecondary institutions. 
This shift to a view of the relationship between student and institution as contractual in nature 
provides a new framework for the student-university relationship (Ardaiolo, 1978). The judicial 
system appears to be adopting this new contractual emphasis in part because many of the issues 
regarding what process is due within the constitutional context seem to have been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the current Supreme Court.  
 Constitutional Issues. The death knell of the judicial doctrine of in loco parentis on 
college campuses was sounded in 1961. A series of rulings by federal courts established that 
students do not “shed their constitutional rights . . . at the schoolhouse gate” (Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent School District, 1969). Depending on the situation and the case at hand, the 
United States Constitution was applied by the courts to the student-institution relationship. Thus, 
the First Amendment protection of speech, press, and religion; the Fourth Amendment protection 
came into play, and student affairs administrators were forced to react accordingly.  
 The freedoms and liberties guaranteed by the Constitution protect individual students as 
citizens from infringement by the U.S. Congress and state governments. As an arm of 
government, the public postsecondary institution is a subject to the same constitutional 
limitations. And, when it can be shown to the satisfaction of a court that a private institution 
functions in such a way that state action is present, then it, too, is subject to the same 
constitutional requirements (Alexander and Solomon, 1972). 
 All these requirements apply to public institutions. Their applicability to private 
institutions varies with the substance of the issue and the specific institution. It could be argued 
from a policy standpoint that private institutions should observe all the procedural requirements 
that apply to public institutions, as this would serve to insulate them from court review. 
Therefore, this chapter draws no legal distinction between public and private institutions. 
 Chronological review of the most important federal case law shows that the term due 
process as applied to the student-university relationship and to the disciplinary and academic 
processes involved has been understood to mean fundamental fairness. While many authors have 
traced and interpreted these judicial developments, the works by Kaplin (1978), Young (1976), 
and Young Gehring (1976) are the most relevant for college administrators. The concept of 
fundamental fairness can be understood and operationalized in the collegiate setting in a way that 
both preserves the educative aspects of student development and does much to protect students 
affairs administrators form judicial intrusion.  
 In 1961, a landmark decision (Dixon v. Alabama State Board of Education, 1961) 
established the right of students at a state institution to notice and a hearing in disciplinary 
proceedings in which suspension or expulsion was a possibility. The court held that “In the 
disciplining of college students . . . [the university should exercise] at least the fundamental 
principles of fairness by giving the accused students notice of the charges and an opportunity to 
be heard in their own defense” (Dixon, 1961 at 150). 
 Due v. Folrida A. & M. University (1963), a case involving campus discipline 
proceedings for students convicted off campus on contempt of court charges, is also significant. 
Due established that the standard for procedural due process in disciplinary hearing is one of the 
fundamental fairness and reasonableness.  
 In Connelly v. University of Vermont (1965), where a medical student received a failing 
grade for make-up work, the court made a distinction between disciplinary dismissal and 
academic dismissal (Mancuso, 1977). Disciplinary dismissal was defined as arising from 
violations of prescribed conduct. Academic dismissal was defined as based on academic 
evaluation. Connelly established the principle that a student must demonstrate arbitrariness, 
capriciousness, or bad faith before a court can interfere in an academic matter.  
 Esteban v. Central Missouri State College (1969) established specifications for fairness 
in student disciplinary proceedings, but it also recognized the unique context and constraints at 
each institution. The court outlined the following nine procedures (Kaplin, 1978): a written 
charge statement, made available at least ten days before the hearing; a hearing for the charged 
students before those with power to spend of expel; an opportunity for the charged student to 
review the information to submitted at the hearing in advance; the right of the charged student to 
bring counsel  to furnish advice but not to question witnesses; the right of the charged student to 
present a version of the facts through personal and written statements, including the statements 
of witnesses; an opportunity for the charged student to hear al information presented against him 
and to question adverse witnesses personally (not through counsel); a determination of the facts 
of the case based solely on what is presented at the hearing by the authority  that holds the 
hearing; a written statement of the findings of fact; and the right of the charged student to make a 
record of the hearing at his own expense.  
 In Gaspar v. Bruton (1975), which dealt with a case involving academic dismissal at a 
state school, the court recognized the property interest of the Fourteenth Amendment. However, 
it stopped far short of the due process standards established in disciplinary dismissals, stating 
“We hold that school authorities, in order to satisfy due process prior to termination or 
suspension of a student for deficiencies in meeting academic performance, need only to advise 
that student with regard such deficiencies in any form. All that is required is that the student must 
be made aware prior to termination of his failure of impending failure to meet these standards” 
(Gasper, 1975, at 843).  
 In another U.S, Court of Appeals decision in that same year, the court extended due 
process protection to the student in an academic dismissal case, because the university notified a 
professional association of the student’s “lack of intellectual ability or insufficient preparation”; 
this stigmatized him, so that he was deprived of a “significant interest in liberty and property” 
covered by the Fourteenth Amendment (Greenhill v. Bailey, 1975). The court head that Greenhill 
should have been notified of his alleged deficiency and that he should have had an opportunity to 
answer such allegations personally. The landmark decision by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Board of Curators of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz (1978) has placed limitations on the 
application of procedural due process requirements to academic dismissals. The court ruled that 
the due process clause does not requires a hearing before the appropriate decision-making body 
when a student is dismissed for academic reasons, if the student has been informed of the 
academic deficiencies in the question and of the danger they pose to timely graduation before it 
makes the “careful and deliberate” decision to dismiss her. In reaching this decision, the court 
assumed that the student had a property or liberty interest at stake. Noting that there is a 
dichotomy between academic evaluations and traditional disciplinary determinations of 
misconduct, the court stated: “Like the decision of an individual professor as to the proper grade 
for a student in this course, the determination whether to dismiss a student for academic reasons 
requires an expert evaluation of cumulative information and is not readily adapted to the 
procedural tools of judicial or administrative decision making . . . Under such circumstances, we 
decline to ignore the historic judgement of educators and thereby formalize the academic 
dismissal process by requiring a hearing” (Board of Curators, 1978, at 79).  
 The Academic/Disciplinary Sanction Dichotomy. As the cases just cited show, it is clear 
that the Supreme Court perceived a difference in the procedural due process requirements for the 
students facing academic sanctions and the due process requirements for disciplinary sanctions. 
A number of articles have dealt with the legal implications of the Board of Curators decision 
(Edwards and Nordin, 1981 p. 70). Of special concern are the court’s seemingly restrictive view 
of the liberty and property rights of students in similar educational institutions and the apparent 
retreat of students’’ corresponding due process rights that the decision signals (Mass, 1980). 
Dessem (1978) interprets the decision to signify that many academic decisions will no longer be 
subject to federal judicial scrutiny and that institutions may even be allowed to ignore their own 
procedures in certain instances. He pointed out that many state constitutions may now afford 
students more due process protection than the federal Constitution, since appears that the current 
Supreme Court is restricting application of the Fourteen Amendment.  
 The dichotomy established in the Horowitz case may be very difficult to apply in fact. 
The court seems to say that significantly less due process is required when academic evaluative 
judgements, such as grading or determinations of students’ suitability for a profession, are 
involved than in a discipline case, when fact-finding seeks to establish whether a student violated 
a rule of behavior. As Kaplin (1978, p. 248) points out, it can be argued that, even in the 
Horowitz case, fact-finding was present, for the justices of the Supreme Court split on the issue, 
with five judges applying the academic label, two judges applying the disciplinary label or 
arguing that no label was appropriate, and two judges refusing to apply either label or to decide 
“whether such a distinction is relevant.” 
 While there is still some confusion about what due process, other than “careful and 
deliberate” decision making, is required in academic evaluation cases, La Morte and Meadows 
(1979, p. 197) suggest that “students have been treated fairly when they understand as precisely 
as possible what is required of them, receive an explanation as soon as possible why they are not 
meeting these requirements and of what steps might be taken to correct their noncompliance, and 
are aware beforehand of the possible outcomes of their actions or nonactions pertaining to 
academic matters.” 
 Discipline as Teaching. The teaching process is unique. Courts have long recognized 
this, and as a result, they have been extremely reluctant to substitute their judgement for that of 
academic experts (Hollander, 1978).  Student affairs administrators must emphasize that they are 
the academic experts in the matter of discipline for it is an important dimension of both student 
development (Greenleaf, 1978; Ostroth and Hill, 1978) and liberal education. As Brubacher 
(1977 p. 82) states, liberal education must “be concerned with habituation in moral conduct as 
well as with its theoretical analysis. It must educate the whole person, the appetites as well as 
intellect.” 
 Disciplinary truly involves teaching. A court  that identified sixteen lawful missions of 
tax-supported higher education (General Order on Judicial Standards of Procedures and 
Substance in Review of Student Discipline in Tax-Supported Institutions of Education, 1968) 
included the following: “(1) To develop students well-rounded maturity, physically, socially, 
emotionally, spiritually, intellectually, and vocationally; (2) to develop, refine, and teach ethical 
and cultural values; and (3) to teach the practice of excellence in thought, behavior, and 
performance” (General Oder, 1968 , p. 133). 
 The significant federal court cases reviewed here all illustrate that what the federal 
Constitution legally requires in student discipline cases is a policy of fundamental fairness that 
governs all procedures. Discipline is a functional aspect of education, and the courts have been 
most reluctant to enter this domain.  
 Student affairs administrators do themselves and students a disservice if they overreact to 
due process requirements. A judicial process on campus that mimics a genuine adversarial court 
hearing is not required and only invites judicial review of the process. If we believe that student 
discipline has education value, then we must adhere to that belief in developing sound judicial 
practices. It must not be forgotten that, many times, the students who violate institutional 
standards are the students who can benefit most from disciplinary measures that can assist their 
cognitive, ethical, and interpersonal growth. As the General Order declared, “the attempted 
analogy of student discipline to criminal proceedings against adults and juveniles is not sound” 
(General Order, 1968 p. 147). 
 This is not to say that one does not have to be expert in administering the educational 
disciplinary process. There has been much litigation in this area, and student affairs 
administrators must be prepared to balance the need and rights of students, faculty, and the 
institution and do so in a way that enables students to learn and the academic community to 
prosper (Rutherford and Osway, 1981). While certain authors (Caruso, 1978; Ostroth and Hill, 
1978; Tice, 1976) have discussed the specifically educational aspects of establishing this needed 
balance, it must be emphasized, first, that discipline is an integral part of the teaching process 
and of student development in postsecondary education and, second, that the courts, for the most 
part, have established fundamental fairness as the basic parameter of students’ constitutional 
rights.  
 Fundamental fairness can be defined as that which is reasonable, impartial, and free from 
bias. As many of the cases just cited show, the courts have defined fundamental fairness as that 
which is not arbitrary, capricious, or done in bad faith. Arbitrariness occurs when actions are 
taken without cause in a n unrestrained or unreasonable way. Capriciousness indicates that an 
action or finding is without rational basis. It should be easy for student affairs professionals to 
understand these commonsense definitions and to articulate them in policies and procedures for 
dealing with students. We should, therefore, let fundamental fairness be our guide and avoid 
using the elusively defined term due process.  
Administration of Student Discipline  
The parameters of the application of constitutionally protected student due process rights in 
public postsecondary institutions as determined by the Supreme Court in the Horowitz  case are 
stated in the preceding section. The knowledgeable student affairs administrator knows, 
however, that a number of other significant aspects in the administration of student discipline 
must also be considered, for lesser federal courts continue to review specific aspects of student 
discipline. Buchanan (1978) provides a concise overview, Kaplin (1978) is most valuable, and 
Young Gehring (1976) are indispensable in keeping abreast of case law and current issues. The 
following synopsis of case law which draws heavily from these three sources, is provided to 
illustrate these issues.  
 Specificity of Rules and Regulation. In developing rules of conduct or regulations of 
performance, administrators must be careful to avoid vague wording, for enforcement of 
vagueness can violate due process. In Soglin v. Kauffman (1969), the term misconduct was held 
to violate due process as a standard for disciplinary action. The general standard for the degree of 
the specificity required was set in the Sword v. Fox (1971). Under that decision, the adequate 
standard “conveys sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by 
common understanding and practice” and allows a student to prepare an adequate defense 
against the charge, as held in Scott v. Alabama State Board of Education (1969). 
 For example, in Lowery v Adams (1972), the court held that the following rule, while not 
as precise as it could be, was still constitutional: “any disruptive or disorderly conduct which 
interferes with the rights and opportunities of those who attend the university for the purpose for 
which the university exists—the right to utilize and enjoy facilities provided to obtain an 
education” (Lowery, 1972, at 446). However, a regulation at Jackson State University that 
permitted only “activities of a wholesome nature” was held to be unconstitutionally vague and 
overboard (Shamloo v. Mississippi State Board of Trustees, Etc., 1980). The court pointed out 
that the regulation was so vague that different university administrators could interpret it in 
different, arbitrary, and discriminatory ways.  
 Composition of Hearing Boards. In an attempt to provide “representation with regard to 
race and sex on the student judicial board” (Uzzell v. Friday, 1980, at 1117), the University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill wet up a quota system assuring that the composition of the board 
was based upon the sex and race of the charged student. This quota system was help to violate 
both the Fourteenth Amendment and the Civil Rights Act, because the quotas violated other 
students’ rights solely on the basis of race. This is not a final ruling because the case is still under 
appeal.  
 However, the right of universities to specify the composition of the hearing boards has 
been upheld. In Sill v. Penn State University (1970), the university was even allowed not to use 
the existing judicial board but to appoint a special disciplinary panel of distinguished private 
citizens. Similarly, in Winnick v. Manning (1972), where the sole judge in a disciplinary hearing 
was an administrator from the dean of students office that had initiated the proceedings, the court 
held that procedural due process had not been violated.  
 Off-Campus Incidents Resulting in On-Campus Hearings. It was established in the 
early 1960s that institutions have the authority to initiate on-campus disciplinary hearings that 
follow normal procedures solely because students have been convicted of crimes against criminal 
or civil law (Due v. Florida A. & M. University, 1963). Universities may also proceed with on-
campus disciplinary hearings without waiting for the result of off-campus criminal proceedings 
for acts that occurred on campus without fear of violating student constitutional rights, 
particularly the right against self-incrimination (Furutani v. Ewigleben, 1969). However, 
institutions must avoid regulations that require automatic disciplinary sanctions for off-campus 
convictions without providing students with a hearing or with an opportunity for students to 
demonstrate that they are not a threat to the institution (Paine v. Board of Regents of University 
of Texas System, 1972). 
 The key in deciding whether to charge a student with violation of university rules for an 
off-campus act is the determination that that act has some detrimental impact on the educational 
mission of the university (Krasnow v. Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, 1976). 
To cite from the influential General Order 91968): “In the field of discipline, scholastic and 
behavioral, an institution may establish any standards reasonably relevant to the lawful missions, 
processes, and functions of the institution… Standards so established may apply to student 
behavior on and off campus when relevant to any lawful mission, process, or function of the 
institution” (General Order, 1968, p. 145) 
 Interim or Emergency Suspension. On occasion, student affairs administrators are faced 
with an immediate situation the facts of which indicate that a student’s continued presence on 
campus constitutes a clear and convincing danger to the normal functions of the institution, to 
property, to others, or to the student himself. Case law (Stricklin v. Regents of University of 
Wisconsin, 1969; Buck v. Carter, 1970; Woodruff v. West Virginia Board of Regents, 1971; and 
Gardenshire v. Chalmers, 1971) has established that administrators have the authority in such 
situations to suspend the student immediately on a n emergency basis until a regular hearing can 
be held. Students should be provided a preliminary hearing before the suspension takes effect, 
unless it is impossible or unreasonable difficult to accord it. In this situation, notice outlining the 
reasons for the action should be given to the student, and a place and time should be set for the 
regular hearing. It is suggested that the regular hearing be head within fifteen days of the original 
action.  
 Mandatory Psychiatric Withdrawal. Recently, many campuses have become concerned 
about the proper response to students who exhibit mental disturbance and about the legality of 
procedures utilized in the mandatory withdrawal of such students for psychiatric reasons 
(Bernard and Bernard, 1980; Zirkel and Bargerstock, 1980). In particular, university 
administrators have asked whether Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 
which prohibits discrimination against the handicapped—who, under its definition, include those 
suffering from “psychological disorder, such as emotional or mental illness”—applies to 
separation proceedings for students who exhibit mental disturbance.  
 Case law on this particular issue is silent for public institutions. In a comprehensive 
review and analysis of related case law, Pavela (1982) argues convincingly that public 
institutions should rely on a properly drafted disciplinary code. Such a code should not use vague 
and ambiguous language in standards that prohibit such behavior as “disturbed,” “of concern to 
others,” or “abnormal”; the code should rely instead no judgement based on the observable facts 
of prohibited behavior. Pavela describes possible procedural standards that an institution that 
believes that the disciplinary process is ill suited for dealing with such instance could adopt. 
Pavela believes that only in instances of severe mental disorder, where a student lacks the 
capacity to respond to charges of where the student does not know the nature and quality of the 
act in question, should the student be withdrawn and referred to an approved mental health 
facility for psychiatric observation and evaluation. Until the future case law provides further 
guidance, this cautionary approach appears to be the best.  
 Right to Counsel. The role of counsel for the student charged in a campus judicial 
proceeding has been well outlined (Gabrilowitz v. Newman, 1978). Two student affairs 
administrators involved in Gabrilowitz (Weisinger and Crafts; 1979; Weisinger, 1981) make it 
clear that this limited right of students is applicable only when the charged student faces criminal 
and university disciplinary charges stemming from the same incident. The institution is allowed 
to proceed before the criminal trial takes place, and the student is allowed to have an outside 
attorney present only to act in a limited and passive role, which does not include presenting a 
traditional legal defense. This limited and passive role allows outside counsel only to directly 
assist the student. The student or a chosen faculty, student or staff advisor who is not an attorney 
conducts the direct defense to the hearing board. Counsel has an opportunity to protect the 
student from self-incrimination and to observe the proceedings firsthand in preparation for the 
pending criminal trial. However, where a university prosecutes students before the appropriate 
hearing authority using an attorney or even a senior law student, the charged students have a 
right to be fully represented by counsel in order to preserve fundamental fairness (French v. 
Bashful, 1969). 
 
Policy Guidelines 
 
 In this chapter, the constitutional context for discipline has been set, and certain 
troublesome issues have been reviewed. Such information is sterile, however, unless it is 
combined with suggestions for good practice based on managerial and educational experiences. 
This section presents some legal policy guidelines that should be considered by those who wish 
to develop a fundamentally fair discipline system.  
 Clearly Articulated Educational Philosophy. Since the time of King Philip Augustus, 
discipline has been a responsibility of educational institutions as we know them. This educational 
inheritance should be understood and clearly stated so that the court fully understands that the 
procedures followed were developed in good faith as part of the lawful educational mission of 
the university. Additionally, student affairs administrators must be able to articulate how these 
procedures contribute to the educational process of student development, for courts are most 
hesitant about intruding in matters in which they are not experts.  
 Specificity of Rules. The regulations of the institution should be presented in such a way 
that their relationship to the educational mission is readily apparent. The regulations should be 
specific enough that students can know their obligations in all situations. The rules should not 
attempt to be exhaustive, for this can be provocative to students adept at exploitation, and it can 
allow the system to break down under legalisms. The regulations should explain the distinction 
between criminal laws and institutional rules, and they should allow the university to deal with 
criminal arrest on and off campus.  
 Authority and Responsibility. The authority to act and the responsibility for action 
should be vested in the same administrative office. If authority and responsibility are split, the 
system can become unmanageable. Discipline is complex, and well-intentioned intrusions by 
members of the academic community can paralyze an elaborate check-and-balance system. 
Additionally, a mechanism should be established that allows both for timely modification of the 
system as case law and experience dictate and for meaningful input from students, faculty, and 
administrators.  
 Choice of Hearing. While no legal requirement specifies who can conduct a hearing, 
experience suggests that charged students should be given a choice between an administrative 
hearing and a board hearing in order to maximize both the educational impact and the 
appearance of fairness to the charged students. The educational aspects of student peer review 
should also be encouraged. However, if peer review is provided, the student board must be 
properly trained and supervised in order to guarantee that the process is both educationally 
meaningful and legally sufficient.   
 Fundamentally Fair Procedures. While some lower courts have suggested specific 
hearing requirements that go beyond the notice and hearing required by the Supreme Court, the 
following can be suggested as fundamentally fair procedures: written notice of the alleged 
violation, opportunity for a hearing with time to prepare for it, confidentiality of proceedings, 
opportunity to hear all information presented and to question all who present information, 
opportunity to present information on one’s own behalf, right to have legal counsel present to 
advise the student, opportunity to challenge the objectivity of judges, and a timely decision.  
 Appeal. An opportunity to appeal a decision is not legally required. However, an 
opportunity to appeal is suggested, in order both to maximize fairness and to correct any defects 
of the original hearing. The grounds for appeal should be outlined. These grounds could include 
original decision contrary to the facts, availability of new information, procedural violations, or 
excessive severity of the sanction.  
 Educational Sanctions. Once the hearing process has established the responsibility for 
violation of a rule, the sanction assigned to a student should be described and administered in an 
educational way, so that its teaching potential is enhanced. Requiring students who violate 
institutional rules to explore the impact of their actions on victims, to prepare papers on the 
meaning of education, or to attend special programs, such as an alcohol education seminar, 
should all be considered.  
 Emergency Suspension. For situations that pose an immediate threat, the institution 
should outline procedures for a policy of emergency or interim suspension before a regular 
hearing can be held. These procedures should include a policy for dealing with the profoundly 
emotionally disturbed. Policy guidelines in these areas minimize the potential for arbitrary or 
capricious decisions by administrators and outline the protections afforded to students.  
 Unified Academic and Social Discipline System.  As the review of case law indicates, 
there can still be some legal confusion over whether a specific violation is of an academic or a 
disciplinary nature, which raises a question about the corresponding appropriate procedures. 
Clearly, charges of cheating and plagiarism are very similar to violations of social standards, and 
they should be treated procedurally in the same manner in a unified administrative system that 
preserves the teacher’s authirty to assign grades, maintains institutional efficiency, and assures 
procedural correctness. In academic evaluative situations that could lead to a student’s dismissal 
and which the facts are disputed, it is suggested that procedures with constitutional safeguards 
similar to social discipline be adopted as a matter of policy to protect the student from arbitrary, 
capricious, or bad faith decision making.  
 
Summary  
 
 Student discipline has evolved through a series of legal interpretations derived from 
common law and constitutional law. It has been firmly established that discipline is an aspect of 
the lawful teaching and student development functions of postsecondary institutions. The courts 
have held that the disciplinary process requires only fundamental fairness, as long as the 
disciplinary process as part of the teaching and educational mission of the university. As a matter 
of common law, the courts have adopted a doctrine of academic abstention, by which they refuse 
to interfere in the basic academic process of teaching and evaluating students (Edwards and 
Nordin, 1979). In dealing with students, the constitutional parameters of due process have been 
defined so that administrators faced with a disciplinary encounter who ask, “What process is 
due?” can answer that the institution must provide procedures governing students that are 
fundamentally fair.  
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